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A TRANSATLANTIC DIVIDE ON THE 
BALANCE BETWEEN FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS AND SECURITY 
Lorenzo Zucca*
Abstract: The lawyers of the Bush administration have taken criticism for 
giving legal advice that some commentators have argued was unethical. In 
prosecuting the war on terror, the reaction within the United States was 
different than that of many European countries. In comparing the belief 
systems underlying the different reactions, this Article argues that the 
European response, which is due in part to their longer experience with 
terrorism and a greater commitment to international law is the healthier 
one. Ethical lawyers need to use good faith in giving their advice and be 
prepared to justify their decisions or perhaps be criminally or civilly liable. 
Introduction 
We must not make a scarecrow of the law, 
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey, 
And let it keep one shape till custom make it 
Their perch, and not their terror.1
 
 Angelo’s words in Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure have much 
the same meaning as those of Attorney General Michael Mukasey in his 
2008 commencement address at Boston College Law School.2 Measure 
for Measure is known as a problem play, in which Shakespeare explores 
themes of “justice and mercy, authority and the abuse of power.”3 An-
gelo, to make it clear from the outset, is the villain in this story. Much 
like Attorney General Mukasey, he was made responsible by his coun-
try’s ruler for the strict enforcement of the laws while the ruler pre-
                                                                                                                      
* The author is a Lecturer in Law at King’s College, London. 
1 William Shakespeare, Measure for Measure act 2, sc. 1. For an analysis of the play 
from a legal viewpoint, see Erika Rackley, Judging Isabella: Justice, Care and Relationships in 
Measure for Measure, in Shakespeare and the Law 65, 65–79 (Paul Raffield & Gary Watt 
eds., 2008). 
2 See generally Michael B. Mukasey, The Role of Lawyers in the Global War on Terrorism, 32 
B.C. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. 179 (2009). 
3 Rackley, supra note 1, at 66. 
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tended to be on a diplomatic trip. Angelo decided to be tough on 
crime and to apply the law without any sense of “measure.” 
 The question presented to this symposium concerns how ethical 
lawyers ought to weigh the competing imperatives of national security, 
civil liberties, and human rights. My answer is simple: ethical lawyers 
should seek to strike a balance between these competing interests in 
good faith. They should be prepared at any point to face judicial scru-
tiny and present evidence to justify their decisions. They must believe in 
the rule of law at any cost. 
 There is at the moment a clear transatlantic divide on this issue. 
The Bush administration put security first and suspended constitutional 
and criminal guarantees for terrorism suspects. Contrastingly, Europe 
just reiterated its commitment to the rule of law, even, if not especially, 
in times of crisis.4
 The two positions reflect two worldviews. One believes in unilater-
alism and emergency powers, while the other embraces multilateralism 
and the enforcement of criminal law. The former may end up com-
promising human rights and civil liberties, while the latter preserves 
those same rights and liberties. My belief is that Europe has something 
to teach the United States. First, a proper understanding of the rule of 
law necessitates a greater respect for international law. Second, deviat-
ing from the established criminal justice system does not help in the 
fight against terrorism. Third, we cannot compromise on our commit-
ment to the rule of law and human rights. 
 Attorney General Mukasey’s rhetoric demonstrates a poor under-
standing of the problems at hand. His speech, to European ears, rings 
as tragicomic as Angelo’s. The epilogue, however, need not be as tragic, 
for there is much we can learn from each other. President Obama faces 
important challenges that he cannot solve alone. As such, the three 
aforementioned lessons from Europe must be taken seriously. Once 
they are, we will be able to address the gross violations of human rights 
that have occurred. 
I. The Rule of Law and International Law 
 The two competing worldviews can be differentiated by their per-
ception of international law. Attorney General Mukasey’s conception of 
the rule of law ought to be called the rule of national law. Europe is 
much more inclined to take international law, and in particular inter-
                                                                                                                      
4 See generally Joined Cases C-402 & C-415/05, Kadi v. Council and Comm’n, 2008 ECJ 
EUR-Lex LEXIS 1954 (Sept. 3, 2008). 
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national human rights law, very seriously. To be blunt, the rule of law 
must incorporate international law. From a European viewpoint, Attor-
ney General Mukasey’s idea of the law is parochial and nationalistic. He 
proudly states that, “this nation’s well-proved commitment to the rule 
of law is what sets it apart from many other countries around the world 
and throughout history.”5 Under such a view, law begins and ends 
within the confines of the United States. There is no concern for inter-
national law, and security really means national security, as if terrorism 
was not a problem of global resonance. 
 The Attorney General’s statement to the class of 2008, that “you, as 
lawyers, must do law,” is reminiscent of Angelo’s “scarecrow” line. It 
speaks to the strict letter of the law, and stresses the responsibility of 
each lawyer to define the scope of what is legally permissible.6 Unfor-
tunately, U.S. law, as Attorney General Mukasey acknowledges, is deeply 
indeterminate when it comes to issues of national security. The limits of 
the executive are not clearly defined by the constitution or by legal 
precedent. Legislation does not provide clear answers to novel ques-
tions, and judicial decisions do not abound in this area. 
 Within this context, the Attorney General’s command, that lawyers 
“must do law,” rings hollow because doing law is different from engag-
ing in matters of policy. “Doing law” according to Attorney General 
Mukasey means to closely read the language of the constitution or 
other legislative acts. If those very acts are indeterminate, however, you 
can read as much as you wish without finding an answer. You will have 
to appeal to something else. What then? It is not policy, it is not the 
text, and, based on recent Executive actions, it cannot possibly be prin-
ciple. 
 Doing law in these cases must boil down to unfettered discretion 
or sheer deference to power. Attorney General Mukasey’s understand-
ing of the rule of law is comic when applied to things like the Geneva 
Conventions.7 The Attorney General’s principal client is the President, 
and his advice and that of his predecessors to that client with respect to 
the Geneva Conventions was to trash the law.8
                                                                                                                      
5 Mukasey, supra note 2, at 181. 
6 Id. (“A lawyer’s principal duty is to advise his client as to what the best reading of the 
law is—to define the space in which the client may act consistent with the law.”). 
7 See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
8 See generally David Cole, Justice at War: The Men and Ideas That Shaped Amer-
ica’s War on Terrorism (2008) (noting Attorney General Ashcroft’s position that foreign 
nationals are not protected by international human rights treaties and that the Geneva 
Conventions are “quaint” as applied to the current conflict). 
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 The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ex-
presses a deep disagreement with the Bush administration’s under-
standing of the rule of law.9 As David Cole points out, “the Hamdan 
case stands for the proposition that the rule of law—including interna-
tional law—is not subservient to the will of the executive, even during 
wartime.”10 In contrast, most Europeans do not question whether in-
ternational law is part of the rule of law, as there are major sanctions 
for its violation. If a government used torture to gather information, an 
individual would have a claim under Article 3 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights (ECHR), which prohibits torture and inhuman 
and degrading treatment.11 If a national court ruled in favor of a gov-
ernment regulation allowing torture, the individual would have the 
ability to challenge the domestic decision before the European Court 
of Human Rights.12 This court has, for example, already ruled that cer-
tain U.K. interrogation practices in Northern Ireland were unlawful.13
 Some countries have made their commitment to human rights 
even more explicit by incorporating the ECHR into their domestic sys-
tem.14 The ECHR, however, is not the only standard of human rights in 
Europe. The European Union, through its Court of Justice (ECJ), has 
developed a substantive body of human rights law since the late 1960s. It 
did so to complement the creation of a supranational space, the Euro-
pean Community. Its first fundamental rights cases were decided in re-
sponse to the demand of the German Constitutional Court, which was 
not prepared to recognize the legitimacy of the ECJ’s decisions so long 
as they did not display a genuine commitment to human rights (“So-
lange principle”).15 Today, the ECJ’s commitment to human rights in an 
age of terrorism is exemplary. 
 A commitment to the rule of law, including international law, 
sends an important message to the whole world about the values for 
which a society is prepared to stand. While it is necessary, however, it is 
                                                                                                                      
9 See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
10 David Cole, Why the Court Said No, N.Y. Rev. Books, Aug. 10, 2006, at 41, available at 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/19212. 
11 See European Convention on Human Rights art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 211 
[hereinafter ECHR]; see also Milena Sterio, The Evolution of International Law, 31 B.C. Int’l 
& Comp. L. Rev. 213, 254–55 (2008). 
12 See Colin Warbrick, The European Response to Terrorism in an Age of Human Rights, 15 
Eur. j. Int’l L. 889, 994–95 (2004). 
13 See Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur.H.R.Rep. 25, Judgment I (1978). 
14 See, e.g., U.K. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42, pmbl. 
15 See Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vor-
ratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125, ¶ 3. 
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not sufficient.  The Bush administration attempted to carve out loca-
tions where the rule of law would not apply; Guantanamo Bay is the 
most glaring example. In Boumediene v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court 
made clear that such internal limitations were not justified. Guan-
tanamo Bay is part of the United States for constitutional purposes.16 
Needless to say, this interpretation of the law belongs to the more out-
ward-looking, European, worldview. It is no coincidence that Justice 
Kennedy, someone who has spent many years researching at the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights joined the majority opinion.17
 In conclusion, Attorney General Mukasey’s admonition, “you must 
do law,”18 can only make sense if the concept of law to which one sub-
scribes is underlined by a robust and extensive conception of the rule 
of law that knows no internal or external limitations. 
II. The Rule of Law and the Criminal Model 
 The years following September 11 can be characterized with vary-
ing degrees of fear and hysteria in the United States. In contrast, after a 
number of terrorist attacks in London and Madrid, life resumed as 
usual with only a few minor changes in the legal system.19 These oppo-
site reactions correspond to the different models on how to deal with 
the threat of terrorism. The United States opted for the emergency 
model, while Europe stuck to its criminal model of investigation.20
 Attorney General Mukasey’s rhetoric is more direct and disturbing 
in the second part of his speech. On eight occasions he scorns those 
lawyers who are risk-averse and exceedingly timid, praising instead, 
“aggressive lawyers who give sound, accurate legal advice.”21 Attorney 
General Mukasey describes the bravery of many people he personally 
witnessed at Ground Zero. An appeal to emotions, however, in order to 
create aggressive lawyers, risks playing down the faculty of reason. That 
reason is most essential when attempting to provide accurate legal ad-
vice. 
 Attorney General Mukasey’s words are akin to Angelo’s line, “we 
should not set up [the law] to fear the birds of prey.” In raising their 
voices against timid and moderate people, both men aim to raise the 
                                                                                                                      
16 See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2251 (2008). 
17 See id. 
18 Mukasey, supra note 2, at 181. 
19 For a comparison between the two models, see David Cole, The Brits Do It Better, N.Y. 
Rev. Books, June 12, 2008, at 68, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/21513. 
20 See id. 
21 Mukasey, supra note 2, at 182. 
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level of fear by suggesting that the community will perish if it does not 
respond aggressively. Once fear is instilled, the response to any threat is 
amplified. The strategies put forward are the result of collective hys-
teria rather than calm deliberation. 
 Both sides of the political spectrum have been caught up in this 
hysteria. To borrow Conor Gearty’s words, “[it is] depressing . . . how 
compliant to power liberal intellectuals can be even when they think 
they are being brave and radical.”22 What is really depressing is to ob-
serve brilliant constitutional lawyers arguing in support of side-stepping 
the constitution. Their fear is so great that it outweighs the document 
that symbolizes the United States itself. 
 Europeans have reacted very differently to these recent terrorist 
threats, largely as a result of their long history with terrorism. Terrorist 
attacks in Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, and France have been 
fairly regular since World War II. The United Kingdom, for example, 
was confronted by terrorists in Northern Ireland; Italy was plagued by 
right- and left-wing extremists in the 1970s; and Spain suffered numer-
ous terrorist attacks by Basque separatists. This long history has helped 
shape European counter-terrorism policies in recent years. 
 Another important difference is that terrorism in Europe is largely 
a threat from within. In the United States, it is perceived as an external 
threat. David Cole suggests that a threat from within is like a cancer, the 
remedy for which is to cure the illness and preserve the host.23 This is 
not the case for an external threat, for which the correct response is to 
obliterate both the disease and the host that nurtured it. 
 A particularly interesting comparison is the United Kingdom’s re-
sponse to al Qaeda following its experience with the Irish Republican 
Army. Decades of conflict, which brought condemnation by the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, taught the United Kingdom that terror-
ism should be addressed within the established criminal justice system. 
In other words, the rules of the game cannot be changed. It is only 
through meticulous gathering of information and accurate criminal 
investigation that terrorism can be fought. This strategy proved itself 
when British police caught and brought to trial the people responsible 
for the London bombings of July 7, 2005. Like the United Kingdom, 
other European states relied on their existing criminal justice systems 
in the wake of terrorist attacks. 
                                                                                                                      
22 Conor Gearty, The Superpatriotic Fervour of the Moment, 28 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 
183, 183 (2008). 
23 See Cole, supra note 19, at 71. 
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 The fear created during the Bush administration has hindered 
such a response in the United States. The only way forward is to trust 
the institutions already in place. This includes criminal prosecution 
and all of the guarantees it provides for defendants. This may indeed 
create burdens for the government. Those burdens, however, exist for a 
reason, and great nations should be able to overcome them and not 
sidestep them by altering the laws. If the United States is able to do so, 
it will send a crucial message to the world: that in order to be a leader, 
one has to embrace the most difficult challenges. 
III. Self-Defeating Rule of Law and the Fundamental  
Right to a Fair Trial 
 The Bush administration weakened and limited the rule of law by 
disregarding international treaties and advocating emergency powers. 
Having addressed the transatlantic divide regarding international law 
and the use of different legal models against terrorism, we can finally 
weigh competing imperatives of national security, human rights, and 
civil liberties. In order to do so, one must first distinguish between civil 
liberties and human rights, and then analyze each with respect to na-
tional security. The right balance is a matter of different variables; how-
ever, there is one human right that cannot possibly be lost in the bal-
ance: the right to a fair trial. 
A. Human Rights and Civil Liberties 
 It is fairly common to distinguish between human rights and civil 
liberties. The latter guarantees that when the state regulates public or 
private life, it will respect individual freedoms. On this point the United 
States and Europe have divergent positions. Europe, for example, is far 
more restrictive of speech than the United States, especially when it 
expresses religious or racial hatred. The reasons for this divergence are 
a matter of history and local preference. European history shows that 
racial and religious hatred can become contagious and extremely dan-
gerous, whereas the United States believes that free speech is the essen-
tial ingredient of democracy. 
 Human rights are not about how the state can regulate certain 
human activities; they are about how people should be treated. Gener-
ally, we say that humans should be treated with dignity. Although many 
disagree on a definition of dignity, it is not difficult to identify viola-
tions. Without providing a comprehensive list of human rights, one can 
intuitively say that they are important and therefore weigh heavily in 
the balance with national security and civil liberties. 
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 Thus, while both civil liberties and human rights are very impor-
tant, only human rights are universal and absolute, while civil liberties 
are relative and can be regulated. The way a state protects or curtails 
human rights and civil liberties sends a powerful message to other 
countries about the values for which it stands. It is in this context that it 
is possible to weigh national security vis-à-vis human rights and civil lib-
erties. 
B. National Security vs. Human Rights and Civil Liberties 
 Attorney General Mukasey states that issues of national security are 
critically important, explaining, “Lives, economic prosperity—our way 
of life—may hang in the balance.”24 While this may be so, information 
about threats to national security is often kept secret, making it difficult 
for the ethical lawyer to accurately weigh the competing imperatives of 
national security and civil liberties. 
 There are two principles that an ethical lawyer must follow in bal-
ancing the competing imperatives. First, the good faith requirement is 
the conditio sine qua non of any legal advice. Without it, the advice of a 
lawyer is at best unprofessional, and at worst criminal. When acting in 
good faith, lawyers can recommend actions that at first may seem objec-
tionable from a legal and moral viewpoint. For example, some lawyers 
would—in good faith—prioritize national security in a way that restricts 
civil liberties. 
 The second principle is that the rule of law cannot be ignored, 
even in good faith. In other words, one cannot deny the most funda-
mental requirement of any legal system: the right to a fair trial.25 This 
does not mean that courts will automatically conclude that human 
rights should be prioritized over national security. It simply means that 
such a decision, made by the government, must be examined by a court 
of justice. When this is the case, the government and the lawyers who 
advised the government will have to produce the evidence that led 
them to reach that decision. It may well be that the decision is fully jus-
tified, in which case the individual petitioner will have to accept that in 
certain circumstances national security does trump human rights and 
civil liberties. In many other circumstances, however, it will be hard to 
justify such a decision, and it may well be that legal advice was given in 
bad faith. 
                                                                                                                      
24 Mukasey, supra note 2, at 181. 
25 See generally Kadi, 2008 ECJ EUR-Lex LEXIS 1954 (holding in part that the ECJ will 
itself review decisions for violations of human rights). 
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 The idea is that the balance between national security and civil lib-
erties is the prerogative of the government, which must have some lee-
way as only it has the benefit of intelligence. If we are serious about civil 
liberties, we have to accept that they might be limited on grounds of 
national security. What we cannot accept is when the government limits 
those liberties on the basis of information that can never be scrutinized 
in a courtroom. Even if the government has a reason to limit civil liber-
ties, it cannot possibly disregard the right to a fair trial, according to 
which the government has to present evidence to justify such restric-
tions. If it cannot provide such evidence, it has acted beyond its powers 
and should be held responsible for its unlawful restriction of human 
rights.26
Conclusion 
 Attorney General Mukasey acknowledges that criminal responsibil-
ity is a spectre looming over the Bush administration, stating, “one even 
hears suggestions—suggestions that are made in a manner that is al-
most breathtakingly casual—that some of these lawyers should be sub-
ject to civil or criminal liability for the advice they gave.”27 Since Presi-
dent Bush has left office, the question of civil or criminal liability 
remains a very important one. It is deeply ironic that Attorney General 
Mukasey condemns those who want law to take its normal course. He 
implored good lawyers to be aggressive. Accordingly, if they believe that 
major breaches of the law were carried out, then they should argue for 
serious punishment. 
 Legal advice is unprofessional when it justifies the violation of le-
gitimate individual interests protected by legal rights. In such cases, the 
government should redress the situation and pay damages. Further-
more, legal advice is criminal when legitimate individual interests pro-
tected by human rights are unjustifiably violated. In these cases, lawyers 
and officials who justified those practices should be found criminally 
responsible. 
 Let me return to Angelo, who applied the law as strictly as possible 
in order to combat sexual decadence in his city, only to fall himself into 
sexual temptation. Can we reasonably argue that his enforcement of 
the law was done in good faith? I believe that his behavior shows that it 
was not, and as such, he should be held responsible for the evils im-
                                                                                                                      
26 See generally Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld’s Memo and the Betrayal 
of American Values (2008). 
27 Mukasey, supra note 2, at 183. 
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posed on other people. Mutatis mutandis, is it possible to justify an ad-
ministration that breaches the law while pretending to uphold it? The 
answer is no. As lawyers you must do law, indeed. And you must be 
aware that if you breach the law and human rights you might be civilly 
and criminally responsible. 
